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Abstract
The non-life insurance industry in Japan underwent 
extensive mergers and acquisitions (M&As) twice in 
the early part of 2000s and 2010s. During the first wave 
of the M&As which took place from 2001 to 2004, 15 
firms were consolidated into 6 firms. In the second 
wave of the M&As from 2006 to 2010, those 6 firms and 
one another firm were integrated under the 3 holding 
companies. Now the 3 holding companies enjoy 86.15 % 
of the non-life insurance market including reinsurance 
special companies. Those M&As are rather unique in 
that they were implemented only among the traditional 
firms and that there appeared to have been no strong 
purposes other than gaining competitive edge by 
expanding the market share. Because the industry had 
already been highly developed and matured, however, 
there are questions as to what is effect of them and 
whether they could fulfill such purposes to better com-
pete under the very stable market and industry envi-
ronment. The hypothetical answers are that they are 
mostly mere addition of the original existing firms with-
out causing any fundamental qualitative changes of the 
market and industry and that the following firms have 
not been able to catch up or pass over the leading firms. 
This paper will substantiate the hypotheses by examin-
ing the management indexes from 1997 through 2013.
Keywords: merger, integration, management index
1. Introduction
The non-life insurance industry and the life insurance 
industry had been strictly segregated by the law for 
almost 100 years until 1995 in Japan. As a result both 
industries have had quite different developments, com-
positions, structures, and features. While both have 
undergone tremendous changes during the recent two 
decades, their experiences have not been like one 
another. For instance, in the life insurance industry, the 
so called “20-firm system” does not exist anymore and 
there are 3 foreign firms in the top 10 life insurers. One 
of the main reasons for this was the “Heisei Life Insur-
ance Crisis” where 7 major life insurers went bankrupt-
cy during the four years between April 1997 and March 
2001. On the contrary, the non-life insurance industry 
did not encounter such crisis and only two medium and 
small size firms were defunct after the war with majori-
ty of the traditional firms having not failed. Accordingly 
who have controlled the property and casualty insur-
ance market are the large domestic insurers.
What has dramatically changed the non-life insurance 
industry was the M&As among traditional major insur-
ers which took place in the early part of the 2000s. 
There were two waves of M&As with the first wave of 
2000 through 2002 and the second one of 2010 and now 
there are only three big insurance groups which enjoy 
the share of some 86 % of the non-life insurance market.
MS&AD consists of 6 traditional insurers, with SJNK 
comprising of 5 traditional insurers and Tokio Marine 
consisting of three traditional insurers. They are the 
holding companies with MS&AD having two non-life 
insurers, Mitsui and Sumitomo and Aioi Nissay Dowa, 
with NKSJ having two insurers, Nipponkoa and Sompo 
Japan, with Tokio Marine having two insurers, Tokio 
Marine and Nichido and Nissin Fire. Nipponkoa and 
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Sompo Japan merged in October 2014 making the larg-
est non-life insurer in Japan.  
Although Nipponkoa and Sompo Japan had been 
united by the holding company already in 2010, their 
merger was a rather epoch making because Nipponkoa 
and Sompo Japan took the position of No.1 company 
from Tokio Marine and Nichido for the first time in the 
history. Now as a single non-life insurance company, 
the ranking is Nipponkoa and Sompo Japan, Tokio 
Marine and Nichido, and Mitsui Sumitomo. As a group 
the ranking is MS&AD, Tokio Marine, and NKSJ. The 
ranking may not mean very much before the fact that 
the three groups are dominant and comparable in the 
non-life insurance market. Furthermore the ranking is 
just by the amount of insurance premium. In terms of 
profit, Tokio Marine and Nichido surpasses the other 
two firms. Then there is a big question as to what are 
the significance, result and ef fect of the extensive 
M&As.
One of the hypotheses to the question is that those 
M&As are merely accumulation of the numbers and 
they did not bring about so much efficiency, growth, 
and profitability etc, which are usually expected for 
M&As. As for Tokio Marine they have had always 
enjoyed the status of No.1 company in terms of size, 
profitability, financial conditions etc. After the M&As, 
they kept the position of the most profitable non-life 
insurer in Japan. That means they did not fail in the 
M&As. On the other hand, MS&AD and NKSJ did not 
catch up or exceed the profitability of Tokio Marine. 
That is to say their M&As were not successful in com-
peting with Tokio Marine. The shareholders’ value of 
Tokio Marine rose some 80 % although the value of 
MS&AD declined about 25 % after the M&As.
They are the mergers among the traditional insurers 
basically on the equal terms which are different from 
M&As done so as to rescue the company in trouble or 
done by foreign insurers. The M&As are quite exten-
sive in that they were the mergers by most of the major 
insurers. Out of top 10 insurers, 9 insurers are included 
in the 16 companies. In 2000, there were 36 insurers 
and other 20 insurers are mostly very small or newer 
companies and the market share of the 16 companies 
was 87.38 % (Table 1). There were only two medium 
size companies which were not involved in the M&As. 
Their market share was 4.64 % and 2.48 % respectively. 
Nevertheless because of the nature of those M&As, 
they did not generate any fundamental qualitative 
changes of the market and industry 
Under the above hypothesis, there must not have 
been so much restructuring, laying off, and cost reduc-
tion even after the mergers. This paper will examine 
management indexes of the original 16 insurers, 6 
merged firms, and 3 holding companies during the time 
period from 1997 through 2013 so as to find any evi-
dence to substantiate the hypotheses. 
One of the most striking features of the non-life 
insurance industry in Japan has been the stability and 
maturity of the market. That remains the same before 
and after the extensive M&As. The result of this 
research will of fer some implications in connection 
with any effect of deregulation and clarification on the 
characteristics and uniqueness of the industry.
2. Existing Study and Methodology
There is not a large body of literature on ef fect of 
M&As or integration of non-life insurers. While this is 
especially true in Japan, there have been a few research 
papers presented in connection with the M&As. Some 
of them are Kubo (2007), Kubo (2011), Yanase (2007), 
and Yanase et al. (2007) etc. The purposes of those 
studies were to find out whether or not the M&As 
resulted in any improvement of efficiency. The method-
ology taken in the studies was Stochastic Frontier Pro-
ductivity Function, Data Envelopment Analysis, and 
Malmquist Index. It is the conclusion of Kubo (2007) 
that the deregulation and M&As generally brought 
about improved ef ficiency and that the extent of 
improvement was more significant in case of the large 
firms than the medium size firm. Yanase et al. (2007) 
proposes a different conclusion that after the M&As 
there was no enhancement of efficiency, although it is 
the conclusion of Yanase et al. (2007) that as a result of 
empirical study using the data of expense ratio, some 
economy of scale has been verified in the non-life insur-
ance industry in Japan.
The purposes of this study are a little different from 
those existing researches in that this aims to substanti-
ate the above hypotheses and that it is the question 
whether relative competitive positions of major insurers 
have been changed by the M&As. Therefore this paper 
will analyze chronological development of various 
indexes for management performance over the period 
from 1997 through 2013. For instance, company A and 
company B merged into company C. If performance of 
A is better than B, comparison is made between A and 
C to see what was the change effected by the M&As. 
Among various indexes for management performance, 
what is more directly related to growth, efficiency, pro-
ductivity, and profitability are (1) net premium, (2) total 
assets, (3) net profit, (4) expense ratio, (5) number of 
employees, (6) premium per capita, and (7) profit per 
capita. 
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The time period from 1997 through 2013 is divided 
into three divisions with the first one being 4 years 
(1997–2000) preceding the first wave of mergers and 
the second one being 4 years (2005–2008) between the 
first wave and the second wave and the third one being 
recent 4 years (2010–2013) after the second wave of 
integration. This is because 16 firms converged to 6 
plus 1 firms during 2001 through 2004 and then ulti-
mately 3 holdings companies during 2006 and 2010 
(Table 1). The average number of 4 years is used for 
comparison purposes. As regards to Tokio Marine, the 
first period is from 2000 to 2003 with the second one 
being from 2004 to 2005, and the third one being 2010 
through 2013 because Tokio merged with Nichido in 
October 2004 and made Tokio Marine Holdings, Inc. by 
integrating the management with Nissin in September 
2006.
Data is taken from Songai-Hoken Tokei Go (The Sta-
tistics of Japanese Non-Life Insurance Business) for 
respective years.
3. Data and Analysis
1) Net premium
MS&AD (Table 2)
The amount of net premium Aioi earned was lesser 
than the addition of Dai-Tokyo and Chiyoda all the time. 
Nissay Dowa always gained more premium than addi-
tion of Dowa and Nissay. Mitsui Sumitomo achieved 
better than addition of Mitsui and Sumitomo all the 
years. Thus Nissay Dowa and Mitsui Sumitomo were 
successful in increasing the percentage from 3.70 to 
4.28 by 0.58 and from 16.72 to 17.43 by 0.71 respective-
ly.
After the integration, Aioi Nissay-dowa decreased the 
percentage than the addition of Aioi and Nissaydowa 
from 15.52 to 15.02 by 0.50. Overall, MS&AD slightly 
increased the percentage from 32.05 to 32.68 by 0.63 
during 1997 to 2013.
NKSJ (Table 3)
The amount of net premium Nipponkoa gained was 
smaller than the addition of Nippon, Koa, and Taiyo. 
The percentage went down from 10.13 to 9.22 by 0.91. 
Sompo Japan also achieved less than the addition of 4 
firms. The percentage did not surpass the addition of 4 
firms all 4 years. After the integration with Sompo 
Japan, the percentage of Nipponkoa went down from 
9.22 to 8.70 by 0.52. The percentage of Sompo Japan 
was barely the same before and after. The percentage 
was very slightly reduced from 17.98 to 17.92 only by 
0.06. The percentage of NKSJ continued to decline 
Table 1. Mergers and Integration of Non-Life Insurers in Japan
The Dai-Tokyo Fire and Marine (6.08) a) Aioi Insurance Company, Ltd. (2001.4) MS&AD Insurance
Group Holdings,
Inc. (2010.4)
Aioi ND (2010.10)
The Chiyoda Fire and Marine (5.38)
The Dowa Fire and Marine (3.27) Nissay Dowa General Insurance Co., Ltd. 
(2001.4)Nissay General Insurance (0.61)
Mitsui Marine and Fire (8.88) Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. 
(2001.4)The Sumitomo Marine and Fire (8.08)
The Nippon Fire and Marine (5.96) The Nipponkoa Insurance Co., Ltd.
(2001.4)
(Taiyo, 2002.4) 
NKSJ Holdings, Inc.
(2010.4)→ 
existing Sompo Japan
Nipponkowa
Holdings, Inc.
(2014.9)
The Koa Fire and Marine (3.82)
Taiyo Fire and Marine (0.16)
The Yasuda Fire and Marine (13.39) Sompo Japan Insurance Inc. (2002.7)
The Nissan Fire and Marine (3.66)
The Taisei Fire and Marine (1.28)
The Dai-ichi P. and C.(0.28)
The Tokio Marine and Fire (18.95) Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance 
Co., Ltd. (2004.10)
Tokio Marine (Milea) 
Holdings, Inc. (2006.9)The Nichido Fire and Marine (5.45)
The Nissin Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (2.13)
a) Parenthesis is the percentage of net premiums to the total of all firms including 2 reinsurance special companies in 
2000 (2000.4.1–2001.3.31).
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Table 2. Percentage of Net Premium to All Firms : MS&AD
Before Merger After Merger After Integration
1997 1998 1999 2000 Aver. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Aver. 2010 2011 2012 2013 Aver.
D 6.12 6.11 6.19 6.08 6.13 11.08 11.22 11.33 11.32 11.24 15.64 15.01 14.87 12.58 15.02
C 5.56 5.53 5.52 5.38 5.50
11.63
D 3.27 3.23 3.19 3.27 3.24 4.27 4.30 4.23 4.31 4.28
N 0.29 0.41 0.54 0.61 0.46
3.70 15.52
M 8.82 8.89 8.70 8.88 8.82 17.70 17.47 17.43 17.10 17.43 17.57 17.68 17.70 17.66 17.65
S 7.82 7.81 7.88 8.08 7.90
16.72
32.05 32.95 32.68
Before Merger After Merger After Integration
1997 1998 1999 2000 Ave. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Ave. 2010 2011 2012 2013 Ave.
N 6.07 5.98 5.96 5.96 5.99 9.40 9.27 9.16 9.05 9.22 8.85 8.81 8.61 8.51 8.70
K 4.09 4.01 3.94 3.82 3.97
T 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.17
Total of 3 firms 10.13
Y 13.01 13.04 13.13 13.39 13.14 18.20 17.97 17.88 17.88 17.98 17.91 17.89 17.89 18.01 17.92
N 3.96 3.89 3.79 3.66 3.83
T 1.38 1.36 1.33 1.28 1.34
D 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.28 0.19
Total of 4 firms 18.50
Total of 7 firms 28.63 27.20 26.62
Table 3. Percentage of Net Premium to All Firms : NKSJ
Table 4. Percentage of Net Premium to All Firms : Tokio Marine
Before Merger After Merger After Integration
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 Ave. 2004 2005 Ave. 2010 2011 2012 2013 Ave.
Tokio 18.95 19.73 20.05 20.09 19.71 25.26 25.13 25.20 24.84 24.90 25.19 25.04 24.99
Nichi 5.45 5.43 5.41 5.36 5.41
Total of 2 firms 25.12
Nissin 2.13 2.12 2.03 2.00 2.07 1.94 1.92 1.93 1.91 1.91 1.87 1.75 1.86
Total of 3 firms 27.19 27.13 26.85
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through mergers and integration during the 12 years. 
The average of 1997–2000 was 28.63 with the average of 
2005–2008 and 2010–2013 being 27.20 and 26.62 result-
ing in the reduction of 2.01. This might be attributable 
to the fact that Taisei, one of 4 original firms went bank-
ruptcy. 
Tokio Marine (Table 4)
The average percentage of Tokio Marine Nichido 
(TMN) was 25.20 whereas the addition of Tokio Marine 
and Nichido was 25.12. After the integration with Nis-
sin, the percentage went down from 27.19 to 26.85 by 
0.34.
2) Total Assets (Table 5)
If you will compare the total assets of the 3 holding 
companies with the addition of 7 or 3 original firms, 
only Tokio Marine increased the amount by 0.5 % with 
MS&AD and NKSJ having decreased the amount by 
1.04 % and 1.87 % respectively.
Table 5. Total Assets After Merger and Integration
Unit : million yen
Company 2000 2005 2013
Dai-Tokyo 1,625,746 Aioi (2001.4)
2,761,116 (93.47)
MS&AD Insurance 
Group Holdings, 
Inc.  (2010.4) 
3,257,180 + 6,098,017 
=9,355,197
Chiyoda 
1,328,166
(2,953,912)
Dowa 1,243,372 Nissay Dowa (2001.4) 
1350426 (103.61)
Nissay 
59,941
(1,303,313)
Mitsui 3,713,926 MS(2001.4) 
7,537,443 (103.78)
Sumitomo 
3,549,196
(7,263,122)
MS&AD Total
(11,520,347)
＜33.14 %＞
(9,355,197)
＜32.10 %(△1.04)＞
Nippon 2,067,286 Nipponkoa (2001.4) 
(Taiyo, 2002.4) 
3,477,787 (100.30)
NKSJ Holdings, Inc. 
(2010.4) 
2,260,231 + 4,838,707 
=7,098,938
Koa 1,304,570
Taiyo 
95,679
(3,467,535)
Yasuda 4,066,722 Sompo Japan (2002.7)
5,934,761 (104.91)Nissan 1,115,893
Taisei 411,425
Dai-ichi Life
56,841
(5,650,881)
NKSJ Total
(9,118,416)
＜26.23 %＞
(7,098,938) 
＜24.36 %(△1.87)＞
Tokio 7,670,181 Tokio (2004.10)
10,814,796 (110.71)
Tokio Marine (2006.9) 
8,374,225 + 418,313 
=8,792,538Nichido 
2,097,975
(9,768,156)
Nissin 543,208
(10,311,364)
＜29.67 %＞
(8,792,538)
＜30.17 %(0.50)＞
Total (all firms) 34,757,802 29,146,287
Premium ￥6,917.1 billion ￥7,851.4 billion
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3) Net Profit
If comparison is made between the average of 4 years 
before and after the mergers, only 3 firms accom-
plished profit larger than the addition of original 2 firms 
(Table 6). They are Nissay Dowa (ND), Mitsui Sumito-
mo (MS), and Tokio Marine Nichido (TMN). Nissay 
continued to record deficit through the 4 years making 
the added amount with Dowa minus. Both MS and 
TMN doubled the profit but the amount of TMN is 
twice of MS. On the contrary, the profit of Sompo Japan 
(SJ) is only ￥4,312 million after the mergers in compari-
son to ￥15,847 million before the mergers. These facts 
support the hypnoses that the level of profit is also the 
Unit : million yen
Net Profit Before Merger Net Profit After Merger
1997 1998 1999 2000 Average 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average
D 6,776 6,342 7,023 7,563 6,926 △83,413 10,304 27,322 16,132 △7,413
C 5,230 5,070 5,208 4,815 5,080
12,006
D 343 161 5,055 5,688 2,811 4,160 △4,348 5,557 5,044 2.603
N △4,209 △3,369 △8,476 △11,669 △6,930
△4,149
M 10,903 9,807 9,850 13,046 10,901 23,607 32,362 72,955 60,765 47,422
S 12,649 11,290 12,636 14,097 12,668
23,569
N 7,142 6,719 7,328 7,904 7,273 △19,067 △28,637 15,885 14,559 △4,314
K 4,850 5,015 5,329 5,652 5,211
T 56 △5,632 △760 440 △1,474
11,010
Y 12,237 12,035 12,866 15,122 13,065 △77,778 △26,948 64,174 57,801 4,312
N 4,071 3,959 4,320 4,878 4,307
T 1,109 1,005 1,036 1,132 1,070
D △2,200 △2,001 △2,428 △3,753 △2,595
15,847
T 33,763 31,964 30,614 43,140 34,870 39,181 97,277 87,895 96,857 92,458 a)
N 9,880 8,929 9,775 10,154 9,684 8,192 11,869 28,562
44,554
N 3,042 2.962 2,985 2,511 2,875 △11,581 2,317 3,010 2,659 △898
a) For the purpose of working out this average, it was regarded that Tokio and Nichido merged in 2001.
Table 6. Net Profit Before and After Merger
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addition of profits of original firms. That is to say, the 
profit level of MS, SJ, and TMN is the reflection of the 
one of the original 6 firms. 
Regarding effect of integration, total profit for the 4 
years from 2010 to 2013 is compared among the 3 hold-
ing companies to see which company is more success-
ful than others (Table 7). Five firms other than TMN 
experienced fairly large amount of deficit once or twice. 
Furthermore as evidence to show any competitive 
strength among the 3 holding companies, this paper 
worked out the percentage of the profit to the total of all 
firms.
In 2011, MS&AD and NKSJ recorded deficits of 
￥66,755 million and ￥60,102 million respectively. 
Although the total of all firms was the deficit of 
￥262,475, only Tokio Marine made surplus of ￥18,447 
million. In 2012 and 2013, the total of all firms was sur-
plus of ￥170,126 million and ￥217,662 million, and the 
share and ranking of the 3 holding companies are 
shown in Table 7. If you will look at the total of 4 years, 
the ranking is Tokio Marine (53.37 %), SKNJ (21.75 %), 
and MS&AD (4.33 %).
4) Expense Ratio
[MS&AD] (Table 8)
The average ratio before the merger was 42.13 and 
44.53 in case of Dai-Tokyo and Chiyoda, whereas the 
ratio after the merger was 37.64 resulting in the 
improvement of 4.49 (42.13–37.64)1). The average ratio 
before the merger was 45.41 and 58.83 in case of Dowa 
Table 7. Percentage of Net Profit to All Firms After Integration
Unit : million yen
2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
Aioi ND △11,417 △43,549 18,862 13,107 △22,997
Mitsui Sumi 12,124 △23,206 29,137 27,350 45,405
MS&AD 707 (0.55) △66,755 47,999 (28.21) 40,457 (18.59) 22,408 (4.33)
Nipponkoa △6,437 △22,584 33,332 22,173 26,484
Sompo Japan 22,881 △37,518 42,654 58,047 86,064
NKSJ 16,444 (12.69) △60,102 75,986 (44.66) 80,220 (36.86) 112,548 (21.75)
TMN 100,713 23,206 58,650 90,823 273,392
Nissin 1,520 △4,759 2,639 3,350 2,750
Tokio M. 102,233 (78.8) 18,447 61,289 (36.03) 94,173 (43.27) 276,142 (53.37)
All Compan 129,605 △262,475 170,126 217,662 517,393
Before Merger After Merger After Integration
1997 1998 1999 2000 Aver. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Aver. 2010 2011 2012 2013 Aver.
D 42.18 42.80 41.14 42.38 42.13 37.28 36.77 37.38 39.12 37.64 40.70 39.97 38.70 39.07 39.61
C 45.07 44.85 44.22 43.98 44.53
D 47.20 46.61 44.81 43.02 45.41 37.03 37.04 38.78 40.31 38.29
N 67.02 64.66 54.94 48.71 58.83
M 43.59 44.47 45.13 42.92 44.03 35.27 35.71 37.29 40.29 37.14 39.98 39.38 38.24 37.58 38.80
S 42.74 43.05 42.21 40.51 42.13
Table 8. Expense Ratio of MS&AD
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and Nissay, whereas the ratio after the merger was 
38.29 resulting in the improvement of 7.12 (45.41–
38.29). The average ratio before the merger was 44.03 
and 42.13 in case of Mitsui and Sumitomo, whereas the 
ratio after the merger was 37.14 resulting in the 
improvement of 4.99 (42.13–37.14). Thus in all three 
cases, the ratio was improved after the merger with the 
margin of 4.49 to 7.12. On the other hand, however, the 
ratio was aggravated after the integration by 1.97 
(39.61–37.64) in case of Aioi ND and 1.66 (38.80–37.14) 
in case of MS. The merger of three groups had favora-
ble effect and the integration did not have any signifi-
cant effect upon the expense ratio.
[NKSJ] (Table 9)
The average ratio before the merger was 43.34, 43.36, 
and 54.59 in case of Nippon and Koa, and Taiyo, where-
as the ratio after the merger was 37.64 resulting in the 
improvement of 4.49 (43.34–40.47). In this connection, 
the best ratio among the three firms is used for the 
comparison purpose. The average ratio before the 
merger was 41.48, 44.97, 49.65, and 72.28 in case of Yas-
uda, Nissan, Taisei, and Dai-ichi Life, whereas the ratio 
after the merger was 37.39 resulting in the improve-
ment of 4.09 (41.48–37.39). Thus in both cases, the ratio 
was improved after the merger with the margin of 4.09 
to 4.49. On the other hand, however, the ratio was 
aggravated after the integration by 0.53 (41.00–40.47) in 
case of Nipponkoa and 2.37 (39.76–37.39) in case of 
Sompo Japan. The merger of three groups had favora-
ble effect and the integration did not have any signifi-
cant effect upon the expense ratio.
[Tokio Marine] (Table 10)
The average ratio before the merger was 37.24 and 
40.37 in case of Tokio and Nichido, whereas the ratio 
after the merger was 34.59 resulting in the improve-
ment of 2.65 (37.24–34.59). However, the ratio was dete-
riorated after the integration by 2.02 (38.61–34.59) in 
case of TMN. As for Nissin, the ratio was improved 
from 42.55 to 40.87. The merger of three groups had 
favorable effect and the integration did not have any 
significant effect upon the expense ratio.
As you will see from Table 5, 6, 7, the best ratio 
among all was 34.59 which TMN achieved after the 
merger. Tokio Marine or TMN recorded the best ratio 
in all three categories. They are 37.24 before the merg-
er, 34.59 after the merger, and 36.61 after the integra-
tion. TMN was most successful in reducing the expense 
ratio as a result of the merger.
5) Number of Employees (Table 11, 12)
If comparison is made between 2000 (before the merg-
ers) and 2005 (after the mergers), the number of 
employees of 4 firms is lesser than the addition of the 
original 2 firms. The number of 2 firms is almost the 
Table 9. Expense Ratio of NKSJ
Before Merger After Merger After Integration
1997 1998 1999 2000 Ave. 2005 2006 2007 2008 Ave. 2010 2011 2012 2013 Ave.
N 43.32 44.18 43.44 42.41 43.34 40.67 40.56 40.19 40.47 40.47 41.30 41.52 41.32 39.84 41.00
K 44.76 44.38 42.86 41.43 43.36
T 55.09 59.62 51.06 52.58 54.59
Y 41.33 42.15 41.49 40.93 41.48 35.01 36.00 38.21 40.32 37.39 41.09 40.27 39.79 37.88 39.76
N 45.43 46.08 44.73 43.62 44.97
T 51.48 51.01 49.02 47.07 49.65
D 55.73 52.52 51.74 129.12 72.28
Before Merger After Merger After Integration
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 Ave. 2004 2005 Ave. 2010 2011 2012 2013 Ave.
Tokio 39.94 38.73 35.91 34.68 37.24 35.23 33.94 34.59 38.17 36.67 36.26 35.35 36.61
Nichi 41.78 41.96 39.26 38.46 40.37
Nissi 45.15 44.78 40.34 39.94 42.55 40.93 41.52 41.23 42.67 41.50 40.16 39.15 40.87
Table 10. Expense Ratio of Tokio Marine
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Table 11. Reduction Ratio of Employees
Company 2000 2005 2013
Dai-Tokyo 5,558 Aioi (2001.4) 
8,683→1,717 (16.5 %)
MS&AD Insurance 
Group Holdings, 
Inc. (2010.4) 
16,654 + 22,230 + 549 
= 39,433
Chiyoda 4,842 (10,400)
Dowa 3,592 Nissay Dowa (2001.4) 
4,082→△85 (△2.1 %)Nissay 405 (3,997)
Mitsui 7,634 M S(2001.4) 
14,923→ 4 (0.0 %)Sumitomo 7,293 (14,927)
(29,324) (39,433)
Nippon 5.700 Nipponkoa (2001.4) 
(Taiyo, 2002.4) 
8,174→1949 (19.3 %)
NKSJ Holdings, Inc. 
(2010.4) 
10,440 + 23,342 
= 33,782
Koa 4,206
Taiyo 217 (10,123)
Yasuda 11,499 Sompo Japan (2002.7) 
15,053→2,435 (13.9 %)Nissan 3,895
Taisei 1,774
Dai-ichi 320 (17,488)
(27,611) (33,782)
Tokio 13,294 Tokio (2004.10) 
15,011→5,047 (25.2 %)
Tokio Marine 
Holdings, Inc. (2006.9) 
22,430 + 2,891 + 156 
= 25,477
Nichido 6,764 (20,058)
Nissin 2,683 2,660→23 (0.9 %)
(22,741) (25,477)
Total (all cos) 96,436 79,565 118,174
Premium ￥6,917.1 billion ￥7,851.4 billion
Table 12. Reduction of Employees After Merger
Company Before Merger (2000) After Merger (2005) Reduction (Ratio)
Aioi 5,558 + 4,842 = 10,400 8,683 1,717 (16.5 %)
Nissay Dowa 3,592 + 405 = 3,997 4,082 △85 (△2.1 %)
Mitsui Sumitomo 7,634 + 7,293 = 14,927 14,923 4 (0.0 %)
Nipponkoa 5,700 + 4,206 + 217 = 10,123 8,174 1,949 (19.3 %)
Sompo Japan 11,499 + 3,895 + 1,774 + 320 = 17,488 15,053 2,435 (13.9 %)
Tokio Nichido 13,294 + 6,764 = 20,958 15,011 5,047 (25.2 %)
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same with the addition of original 2 firms. Thus it can 
be said that the majority of the firms were successful in 
reducing the number of employees after the mergers. 
The ranking by reduction ratio is Tokio Marine Nichido 
(25.2 %), Nipponkoa (20.0 %), Aioi (16.5 %), Sompo 
Japan (14.0 %), Mitsui Sumitomo (0.0 %), and Nissay 
Dowa (△2.1 %). It is notable that the number of Mitsui 
Sumitomo remained the same after the merger.
However, if you compare the number between 2000 
(before the mergers) and 2013 (after the integration), 
the number of all 3 holding companies significantly 
increased after the integration. MS&AD increased the 
number from 29,324 to 39,433 (134.5 %), NKSJ from 
27,611 to 33,782 (122.3 %), and Tokio Marine from 
22,741 to 25,477 (112.0 %). The increase of the net pre-
mium income from 2000 to 2013 is 113.51 % (see Table 
2).
6) Direct Premium and Profit Per Capita
Aioi decreased premium per capita from ￥110,052,000 
to ￥108,607,000 and profit per capita from ￥1,356,000 to 
￥1,098,000. Nissay Dowa slightly increased premium 
per capita from ￥86,743,000 to ￥87,861,000 and 
decreased profit per capita from ￥1,299,000 to ￥832,000. 
Mitsui Sumitomo decreased premium per capita from 
￥111,518,000 to ￥99,660,000 and significantly increased 
profit per capita from ￥1,681,000 to ￥3,302,000.
4. Conclusion
1) Growth 
Among 6 firms which were born as a result of the 
M&As of 15 firms, 3 firms increased the percentage of 
net premium and 3 firms decreased the percentage. 
Thus the results are mixed. However, the change is 
very nominal with the increase being from 0.08 to 0.71 
and the decrease being from 0.39 to 0.91 (Table 14). As 
for the 3 holding companies, only MS&AD increased 
Table 13. Direct Premium and Profit Per Capita 
(Average of 4 or 2 Years)
Unit : 1,000 yen
Company
Before Merger
(1997～2000)
After Merger
(2005～2008)
After Integration
(2010～2013)
Premium Profits Premium Profits Premium Profits
Dai-Tokyo 110,052 1,356 Aioi Aioi ND
Chiyoda 90,195 951 108,607 1,098 (MS&AD)
Dowa 86,743 1,299 Nissay Dowa 84,493 1,825
Nissay 76,990 (-)14,727 87,861 832
Mitsui 106,739 1,330 MS MS(MS&AD)
Sumitomo 111,518 1,681 99,660 3,302 83,329 (-)285
Nippon 99,630 1221 Nipponkoa Nipponkoa
Koa 92,601 1,204 93,130 1,321 (NKSJ) 648
Taiyo 77,208 (-)4,281 66,088
Yasuda 107,673 1,137 Sompo Japan Sompo Japan
Nissan 86,564 1,046 95,765 1,526 (NKSJ)
Taisei 68,181 551 70,394 269
Dai-ichi Life 38,311 (-)6,924
(2000～2003) (2004～2005) (2010～2013)
Tokio 141,436 5641 Tokio Nichido Tokio HD
Nichido 91,211 2,752 141,676 7,242 99,882 3,392
Nissin 69,608 (-)312 64,086 1,078 53,204 230
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the percentage by 0.63 with NKSJ and Tokio Marine 
having decreased by 2.01 and 0.34 respectively. Like-
wise the extent of increase and decrease is rather insig-
nificant except for the decrease of NKSJ (Table 2, 3, 4). 
Furthermore, regarding developments of total assets, 
only Tokio Marine narrowly expanded the amount by 
0.5 % and both MS&AD and NKSJ curtailed the amount 
by 1.04 % and 1.87 % as stated above (Table 5). These 
are the evidences to strongly support the hypnoses to 
the effect that the M&As were mere addition of the 
number and did not bring about so much value for the 
firms.
2) Competitive Strategy
This paper assumes that one of the important reasons 
and purposes of the mergers and the integration was to 
gain competitive edge against other companies under 
the highly developed and very stable industry environ-
ment. Therefore it is the question whether companies 
could take advantage of the mergers and the integration 
in competing with their rival companies or whether 
there was effective competitive strategy in the mergers 
and the integration. To this end, comparison of the net 
profit is made during the three time periods.
As regards to Mitsui Sumitomo (MS), Sompo Japan 
(SJ), and Tokio Marine Nichido (TMN), both MS and 
TMN doubled the net profit after the mergers with SJ 
having decreased the profit to 27 % of the preceding 4 
years. Furthermore the profit of TMN is twice of MS 
both before and after the mergers. This seems to be a 
natural consequence that all 4 firms, that is to say, Mit-
sui, Sumitomo, Tokio, and Nichido, were profitable 
companies before the mergers, which is a good con-
trast with SJ. This implicates that the profit of the 
merged company is also the addition of profits which 
member company had made before the mergers. 
After the integration, 5 firms other than TMN experi-
enced fairly large amount of deficit once or twice. For 
instance, in 2011, MS&AD and NKSJ recorded deficits 
of ￥66,755 million and ￥60,102 million. Although the 
total of all firms was the deficit of ￥262,475 million for 
the year,  only  Tokio Marine made surplus of 
￥18,447million. Tokio Marine made the profit of 
￥276,142 million (53.37 %) with NKSJ and MS&AD hav-
ing recorded the profit of ￥112,548million (21.75 %) and 
￥22,408million (4.33 %) during 2010 through 2013. The 
percentage in the parenthesis is the proportion of the 
amount to the total of all firms during the same 4 years. 
The profitability of Tokio Marine is overwhelming. 
Because it was the case well before the mergers, 
MS&AD and NKSJ did not effectively compete even 
through the mergers and the integration.
Increase of Market Share Decrease of Market Share
Aioi △0.39 (11.63→11.24)
Nissay Dowa 0.58 (3.70→4.28)
Mitsui Sumitomo 0.71 (16.72→17.43)
Nipponkoa △0.91 (10.13→9.22)
Sompo Japan △0.52 (18.50→17.98)
Tokio Marine 0.08 (25.12→25.20)
Table 14. Change of Share After Merger 
Table 15. Expense Ratios After Merger
Company After Merger Before Merger After Merger Improvement
Aioi 42.13 + 44.53 37.64 4.49
Nissay Dowa 45.41 + 58.83 38.29 7.12
Mitsui Sumitomo 44.03 + 42.13 37.14 4.99
Nipponkoa 43.34 + 43.36 + 54.59 40.47 2.87
Sompo Japan 41.48 + 44.97 + 49.65 + 72.28 37.39 4.09
Tokio Nichido 37.24 + 40.37 34.59 2.65
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3) Efficiency
After the mergers, all of the 6 firms accomplished 
enhancement of efficiency (Table 15). The extent of 
improvement varies from 7.12 to 2.65. The highest 
number is the one of a smaller company. The lowest 
number is the one of the largest company. Because the 
Tokio Marine had already enjoyed the best expense 
ratio, the margin of improvement is smaller than other 
companies. On the contrary, the integration had rather 
unfavorable effect upon efficiency (Table 16). In other 
words, expense ratios of all five firms other than Nissin 
were slightly worsened. That is considered to be one of 
the reasons that Nipponkoa and Sompo Japan merged 
in October 2014.
As a result of the mergers, 4 firms reduced the num-
ber of employees (Table 12). The reduction ratios were 
from 25.2 % to △2.1 % (increase of employees). The 
ranking of the reduction ratio is TMN (25.2 %), Nippon-
koa (20.0 %), Aioi (16.5 %), Sompo Japan (14.0 %), Mitsui 
Sumitomo (0.0 %), Nissay Dowa (△2.1 %). After the 
integration, however, all 3 holding companies recorded 
the significant increase of employees, which implies 
that the integration did not contribute to improvement 
of efficiency. This is consistent with the development of 
expense ratio which implies that although the mergers 
resulted in some improvement of efficiency, the integra-
tion had rather unfavorable effect upon efficiency.
Among 3 holding companies, MS&AD, now the big-
gest company is mostly faced with needs to heighten 
efficiency after the integration. For instance, MS&AD 
hires 39,433 employees as against 25,477 employees of 
Tokio Marine, while the difference of market share is 
only 5.8 % (Table 11, Table 2, 4).
4) Productivity
Results on productivity are mixed depending on wheth-
er they come from premium per capita or profit per cap-
ita. After mergers, only 2 firms very slightly enlarged 
their premium per capita and other 4 firms experienced 
curtailment of the percentage from 1.31 % (Aioi) to 
11.06 % (Sompo Japan) (Table 17). These data suggest 
that mergers actually lessened productivity of those 4 
firms and did not so much improve productivity of 2 
firms. On the other hand, profit per capita of 4 firms 
highly or fairly rose by the percentage of 96.43 % (Mit-
Table 16. Expense Ratios after Integration
Company After Integration Before Integration After Integration Improvement
Aioi Nissay Dowa 37.64 + 38.29 39.61 △1.32
Mitsui Sumitomo 37.14 38.80 △1.66
Nipponkoa 40.47 41.00 △0.53
Sompo Japan 37.39 39.76 △2.37
Tokio Nichido 34.59 36.61 △2.02
Nissin 41.23 40.87 0.36
Table 17. Percentage Change of Direct Premium and Profits Per Capita After Merger
Company Premium Increase (%) Profit Increase (%)
Aioi △1.31 △19.03
Nissay Dowa 1.29 △35.95
Mitsui Sumitomo △10.63 96.43 a)
Nipponkoa △6.52 8.19
Sompo Japan △11.06 34.21
Tokio Nichido 0.17 28.38
a) While the increase ratio of Mitsui Sumitomo is more than triple, the increase of Mit-
sui Sumitomo is from ￥1,681,000 to ¥3,302,000 and the increase of Tokio Marine is 
from ￥5,641,000 to ￥7,242,000.
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sui Sumitomo), 34.21 % (Sompo Japan), 28.83 % (Tokio 
Nichido), 8.19 % (Nipponkoa) with only Nissay Dowa 
and Aioi having experienced decrease of 35.95 % and 
19.03 % respectively (Table 17). While most firms lost 
some portion of premium per capita, they gained profit 
per capita. Therefore the mergers had some favorable 
effect upon productivity.
Table 18 shows the difference between the average 
figures of 1997 to 2000 (in case of Tokio Marine, 2000 
to 2003) and 2010 to 2013 in connection with the direct 
premium and profit per capita of MS&AD, NKSJ, and 
Tokio Marine. It is apparent that the integration did not 
contribute to improve productivity generally. Although 
Tokio Marine also experienced decrease, their produc-
tivity is far beyond the others (Table 13).
5) Overall Results
As stated above, there are enough evidences to support 
the hypotheses that the M&As of non-life insurers in 
Japan are mere addition of number and that they could 
not be fruitful in creating any added value or strength-
ening competitive edge. This is because they are the 
M&As only among traditional insurers in a very stable 
and highly matured industry environment. Indeed they 
are the extensive M&As in the sense that they involved 
16 insurers including top 9 insurers, but they are not 
the events which would fundamentally change the 
structure and nature of the industry. While a few small-
er insurers might have been rescued, as far as some top 
ten insurers are concerned, their business environment 
and competitive conditions have not been so much dif-
ferent before and after the mergers and integration. 
As for mergers, there are some evidences that they 
improved efficiency and productivity to some extent 
which is consistent with some of the preceding studies. 
On the contrary, as regards to integration, it has had 
only unfavorable or neutral ef fect on all aspects of 
examination. Therefore there is a question as to what 
are purposes and significance of the integration. It is 
conceivable that the mergers and integration have been 
made so as to cope up with foreign insurers in the glob-
al market. If that is the case, it is a matter of future 
development and growth they can achieve in overseas 
countries.
This is the paper presented at the World Risk and 
Insurance Economic Congress held in Munich during 
August 2 through 6, 2015. The author is thankful to the 
discussions made by professor Xian Xu of Fudan Uni-
versity and comments by the participants in the ses-
sion.
Notes
1) The best (or better) ratio among the companies is used for 
the comparison purpose.
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